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The issues concerning the determinants of agricultural produc
tion, 
food supply, and their growth are currently of great interest
 in developing 
and developed countries. This in turn has led to extensive r
esearch into 
the effectiveness of various price intervention schemes and o
ther incentives 
that can be offered within the agricultural sector. Basic to
 the entire 
an~lysis is a qualitative and quantitative understanding of th
e determinants 
of the dynamics of supply and its responses to altered incent
ives in 
a0riculture. 
The land allocation decision could be rerardcd as an exar.iple 
of 
a discrete process over ti~e within a cocpctitive market for 
the output. 
Vsin~ annual averape prices, econonists have sur,r,ested differ
ent theo1·etical 
and enpirical ways to evaluate farmers' responses to changes 
in crop prices. 
The existence of consistent patterns of serial and cross-seri
al correlations 
between land allocations, production and prices has been obse
rved and debated 
The best knol-m were the Cobwebin the econot1ic literature for r.iany years. 
theory (i:zckiel [1933]) and the observations on the Corn-Hog 
Cycle as 
The fact that output sellingdiscussecl in Coase and Fowler [1935, 1937]. 
price is not observed at the tine when input decisions arc ma
de and the 
necessity for farr,1ers to forr:t expectations on the future pric
e have been 
su~mested as the r.1ain reasons for the cyclical move1aents of o
utput. 
Early single equation estirnates, with current output as a fun
ction 
only of one past price, showed small link between prices and 
output. Then 




distributed lag model could explain much of the supply response to output 
price changes. Using static microeconomic theory Nerlove [1958] justified 
an econometric franework for interpreting farmers' responses to prices by 
estimating a single distributed lag equation. This e(]uation describes the 
current area as a linear function of lagged areas, the ·lagged price and 
other current and laggeJ exop,enous variables. The coefficients are non­
linear functions of the parameter of a linear supply equation, an adjust-
ment paraneter for desired area versus actual area and an adaptive expectations 
parameter.
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Askari and Cummings [1976] report on more than 600 estimates 
of different versions of Nerlove's model for many crops and countries. 
Huth [1961] criticized the adaptive expectation formulation of Nerlove and 
sugiested the rational expectations hypothesis. Hore recently, 1;erlove [197~] 
analyzed the traditional supply response model in light of recent develop­
ments :in econonic time series models (e.g., 1;/erlove et al. [1979a]). 
In i'.1:-1 vie,,, the r:i.ain o.raPbacb:; of the ·;::erlovian [1958] nodel are that 
it did not analyze the specific dynamics of the crops production functions 
and that the moriel's structural parameters are independent of the crops 
price processes (see Eckstein [1981]). Hence, the Herlovian [1958] model 
is subject to Lucas's [1976] general critique on economic policy evaluation. 
In this study, an empirical model of agricultural supply is derived 
fron a dynamic and stochastic frane~mrk where farners are assune<l to maxir:1ize 
the expected present value of profit subject to dynamic and stochastic
.,
technology and their information.~ Farmers are assumed to form rational 
expectations, i.e., they are assumed to know the actual distributions of 
exogenous variables, as well as land productivity which is assumed to be 
The analysis focuses on the dynamics of the crop productionendogenous. 
technology and the simultaneous determination of aggregate land productivity, 
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Hence, a farncr's input decision rulesland allocation and crop prices. 
depend on the parar.ieters of the actual dynamic process of pri
ces which are 
In this context, it is straightforwardsubject to governmental control. 
to show that rational farmers are unlikely to interpret price
 fluctuations 
that are serially uncorrelated as signalling permanent altera
tion in the 
incentives confronting them. Furthermore, any pennanent or t
emporary changes 
in taxes, subsidies and tariffs policies affect the dynamic r
esponse of the 
cropped area, such that the structural form of the land alloc
ation equation 
varies with the policy rule. Consequently predictions with r
espect to changes 
in policy require complete identification of the economic rel
ations. We show 
that this model may give rise to dynamic land allocation that
 exhibit the "Cobweb 
Phenomenon" of frequent fluctuations. The main causes for th
e fluctuations 
in land allocations and production are the inherent dynamics 
of land producti­
vity in the production function (i.e. depletion of land ferti
lity), the 
stochastic movement of international crop prices and the shoc
ks to productivity 
The model is
from sone uncontrolled events (e.g., weather and water supply
). 
inplenented by investigating data on the Egyptian ar,ricultura
l sector, including 
The f .1rmers produce an e:iq,ort cropcropped acres, crop yields and prices. 
(cotton) and an import crop (wheat) so they respond to prices
 and to governmen­
tal policies in an open economy. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section II we discuss
 the 
In section III we solve and analyzetechnolor,y of annual crops production. 
a dynamic land allocation model for two crops where output pr
ices are 
exogenously given. In section IV we discuss the effects of o
ther inputs on 
the dynamics of supply. Time series analysis of the Egyptian
 data and 
estimation of the land allocations model from section III are
 reported in 
section V. 
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II. The Technology 
When land is continuously cultivated, the issue of substitution 
and complementary effects in production of alternative crops become, 
important. Cotton and corn are high nitrogen using crops. Soybeans, clover 
and alfalfa (leguminous plants) supplement the nitrate content of soil. The 
depletion of nitrate from the soil is an important direct constraint on the 
development of land fertility and the production of all crops. Furthermore, 
monoculture cause an accumulation of crop specific insects and worms which 
have an important indirect effect on the actual crop yield from the land. 
Hence, the current productivity of land for a given crop depends on the 
cropping history of a plot of land. 
Crop rotation is the well known method to prevent the direct and the 
indirect deterioration in land productivity under continuous cultivation. 
Fertilizer and pesticides are the main inputs which control directly land 
productivity by building up the content of the soil and eliminating the 
insects and the worms. 
The existance of deterioration in land productivity introduces a 
non-trivial dynamic element in the allocation of land between different 
crops. In general, the above technological characteristics of crop produc­
tion imply that the current marginal product of past land allocations for 
a specific crop is negative. Furthermore, farm production is identified 
with the fact that almost all input decisions are made before output prices 
are known, and the final output is subject to unknown shocks from water 
supply and weather conditions. Both the prices and the shocks to production 
are uncontrolled stochastic processes that affect farmers' income. Hence, 
the practice of crop rotation and the application of fertilizers and pesticides 
are outcomes of a stochastic dynamic optimization problem that farmers have 
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to solve. Thus, crop rotation, that is defined by the sequence of land 
allocations, is a function of the past land allocations as well as the 
stochastic processes of the uncontrolled variables. 
In what follows, we analyze the effects of deterioration in land 
productivity on the dynamics of crop supply, land allocation, farmers 
response to price and the observed serial and cross-correlations between area, 
yield and prices. The analysis is done by using explicit approximations for 
production process that includes almost all of the technological componentsa 
that have been described above. The explicit functional forms enable us to 
derive analytical solutions for the farmers optimization problem which 
simplify the exposition of the results and provide regression equations 
for estimation. 
111 Dynamic Land Allocation for Two crops 
In this section we analyze a stochastic dynamic optimization 
problem of a farmer endowed with land that can be allocated between two 
cotton and wheat). lJe show that if the cultivationdifferent crops (e.g., 
of at least one crop (e.g., cotton) results in deterioration of land 
productivity, due to successive use of the land for that crop, the 
optimization yields a dynamic land allocation process. The optimal 
decision can be interpreted as a crop rotation with the property that 
current land allocation depends on past land allocations, expectations 
of future crop prices, and other variables that are part of the objec­
tive function or part of the constraint functions. 
It is assumed that crop prices are exogenously determined such 
that aggregate land allocations do not affect the movement of the prices 
over time. For simplicity, the model considers a representative farmer 
whose only variable factor of production is lan~. 
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Consider the definitions of the following variables: 
Xit is the production of crop i at time t, 
Pit is the price that farmers receive for the production of crop i at time t, 
Ait is the land allocated to crop i at time t, 
A is the total available cultivated land at time t, 
0 < S <l is the objective discount factor, 
ait is the shock to production of crop i at time t, 
St is a vector of n-2 exogenous variables at time t, such as 
taxes, tariffs and other variables that contain information 
f ,f2 , g1 , d are positive parameters of the production functions,1 1 
Eis the mathematical expectation operator, where Et(X) c E(xlnt) 
and nt is the information set at time t + 1, 
Lis the lag operator which is defined by the property 
The farmer is assumed to maximize his discounted expected profit 
in terms of the price of crop 1 (cotton). Hence, the farmer's objective 
is to maximize 
(3 .1) 




The production function of crop 1 
A A
A +d(l _.!!::!_.J!.)}A_(3.3) lt 1 - --itA A 
The production function of crop 2 
(3.4) 
The production function nf crnn 1 i.~ "t1Rc'!rAtic, '!'ltrictly c
onc:nve in 
A . A 
Alt and is subject to shocks, a1t. 
The last te;rm in (3.3),~1
(1 - ,:t-l _ lt), 
A A 
is meant to approximate the deterioration in land produ
ctivity. For d1 
> O, 
. our particular approximation suggests that if the sumr:i
ation of the fractions 
of land from last and current periods is greater than on
e, then the current 
average productivity of land reduced. Furthermore, if t
he summation of 
/A, and Alt-i'A is less than one, the· current cultivati
on of crop 1 is on
A
1 
land that has been used for crop 1 for only the current 
year. llence, the 
If the sum of A1/A
 and Alt-l/A is equalaverage productivity is increased. 
to one, there is no linkage he tween the current average 
productivity of land 
and past cultivations. Notice that this term introduces
 a dynar.iic element 
Alt 1 
into the production function. Only if it turns out that
 -=- •2 for all
A 
In ·what follows,t ~ O, would tile fan.1er's pro:ilen seerJ to be static. 
we shou that a positive d1 
gives rise to a land allocation process that 
can be regarded as crop rotation, which is a well known 
practice in agri­
culture when land deteriorates under continuous cropping
. 
8 





t lt t 
{P Zt (F2 + a2 t)} is theby choice of A10 , All, A12 , .••• , where Itt = p~ t 
"real shadow price" fvr crop 1 land allocations, and n is the farraer'st-1 
information set at tirae t which assumed to be 
The optimization is subject to a given level of A1 ,
 _1 
and a 




o(L) = I - o L - o L
2 - ... -1 2 
where oj is an n x n matrix for j = 1, ••• , k, Ut is an n x 1 vector, 
Further, it is assumed that the vector stochasticdefinite matrix. 
process (3.6) is of mean exponential order less than 1/ ./s , so that a 
It is assumed thatconstant and a trend can be part of the vector St 
• 
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the variables in the vector Zt 
are uncontrollable and unaffected by the 
farmer's decisions, i.e., prices are assuned to he exogenously given 
to the 
representative farmer. 
In _appendix A we derive the optirwal decision rule for problem (3.5) 
and we show that the unique solution can be written as (see Jt.8): 
(3. 7) 
for all t • O, 1, 2, • • • • Where -1 < A1 < 0 and
 A1 is a fu
nction 
of gl' d1 , 
-A and 8 •3 
ilote that Alt depends on current expectations of all future values 
of the exogenous variables weighted by a factor that depends on the p
arameters 
of the production function. Further, land allocation at time t depen
ds on 
the last period decision which is known at tir.ie t. In general, if we 
include 1:1ore than a one year deterioration effect, the number of lags
 of 
land allocations in (3.7) will be equal to the number of years in the 
cu~ulative dynamic factor in the production function.
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For any arbitrary set of expectations, (3.7) implies that: 
> 0 •(3.8) and 
Hence, if farmers expect that the current output price of crop 2 relative
 to 
the price of crop 11s going to decrease, they will increase the curr
ent land 
But, if farmers expect that in the followinz year theallocated to crop 1. 
price of crop 2 relative to the price of crop 1 is going to decrease,
 they 
will decrease the quantity of current land allocated to crop 1. The
 first 
10 
result is exactly as any static model would predict. However, the second 
result is different from that of any static model or the usual dynamic model 
. 5
with costs of adjustment in land a11ocations. In a static model the second 
term in (3.8) is zero. Dynamic models with adjustment costs in land allocations, 
imply that the one-year ahead output prices affect current decisions. In 
Appendix B we show that the adjustment costs model is equivalent to our model 
if d is negative. In this case, Al is positive and less than one, and
1 
we have the same result for the first term in (3.8) but the opposite result 
with respect to the second term. 
The assumption of rational expectations implies that farmers 
maximize (3.5) subject to the true stochastic process of the exogenous 
variables. Therefore, the conditional mathematical expectations of 
the exogenous variables depend on their stochastic process (3.6) and 
the information farmers are assumed to have at time t, which includes 
Assuming rational expectations in the certainty case, (3. 7) is· the 
optimal decision rule for land allocations to crop 1, where 
j = 0,1,2, ••• , i.e., 
perfect foresight. In the uncertainty case the optimal decision rule can be 
written as (see Appendix A, (A.11)) a function of variables that are known 
to the farmer at time t, i.e., 
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for all t • O, 1, 2, ••• • Where y • 
1 • 1, 2,
and µ L + ••• for all • n •11 
where J < k • 
Equation (3.9) is an exact closed form analytical s
olution for the farmer's 
optimal land allocation decision rule at time t. 
Observe that µi's coefficients are some non-lineAr 
function of >.1 , 
B, d1 and cs's co
efficients, which expresses the restriction imposed 
across 
the decision rule and the parameters of the stochas
tic processes for 
Further, notice that all the variables that are invariables in Zt. 
the information set which help to predict future va
lues of prices (R's) 
llence, the laBged
and technological shocks (a1
's) are in the decision rule. 
Z's are instruments for the farmer's solution of hi
s prediction problem and 
they turn out to be instruments for the econometric
ian's estimation problem. 
~iote that the constants in the vector stochastic pr
ocess Zt are part of the 
'1ecision rule, therefore, one of the lJ' s is a const
ant containing tl1e 
constants of the processes. For example, a once-an
d-for-all deterministic 
shift in prices uill innediately affect the· current
 land allocation through 
a change in the constant of the Rt process. TI1e ma
gnitude of the immediate 
' s. Hence,




preclictions with respect to a permanent chanr.e in r
elative prices require a 
complete identification of the model's parameters, 
eventhough prices are 
As long as the uncontrolled variable areexogenous (see Lucas [19i6]). 
stochastic, land allocations do not necessarily mov
e toward a static 




as the lon8 run land allocation. From (3.9) it is clear that a negative 
>..l (dl > 0) implies a lower mean for Alt' versus a positive (dl < O) or 
zero (dl = O) degree of serial correlation in land allocations. Hence, the 
deterioration in land productivity decreases the average land allocations 
for crop one and implies a particular pattern of cyclical movements in the 
areas planted to different crops. 
Suppose we consider the following case: the shocks to production 
(a1 's) and the price (R's) are serially uncorrelated and are independent of 
variables that are in the infoIT:Iation set, alt has zero mean and Rt 
has a positive mean. The equation (3.9) can be ·written as: 
(mean of R)• 
* and the mean of A1t, A1 , is(3.10) 
= 
For the relevant domain of d1 , we 
obtain 0 and o. 
Thus increasing the rate of land deterioration decreases the area allocated 
to crop 1. Equation (3.10) shm1s that farmers would not interpret price 
fluctuations and shocks to production that are serially uncorrelated as 
6sir,nalling permanent alteration in the incentives confronting them. 
Consider the experiment of a once-and-for-all increase in the mean of 
the relative price, R. Using equation (3.10) the immediate response for 
* Alt is a decrease below the (lower) new level of A1 , and by frequent 
fluctuations to converge toward the new mean of Alt" Hence, the 'short run' 
effect is greater than the 'long run' and the "Cobweb Phenomenon" is, in 
13 
this model, an optimal response and has nothing
 to do with price expectations. 
In the general case, the first equation in (3.10) 
is only part of 
( 3.9), where the mean of R is replaced by the c
onstant in the stochastic 
The second equation in (3.10) is thedifference equation for R in (3.6). 
unconditional mean of Alt ignoring the effects 
of variables which are in gt-l 
Observe that a once-and-for-all increasebesides the relative prices (R's). 
in the mean of R is equivalent to an increase i
n the constant in R's stochastic 
equation. Hence, the qualitative implication o
f the above experiment holds 
in the general case as well. 
It is straightforward to see that in the case o
f adjustment cost 
0,1 > 0 and d1 
< 0), the sign of both the immediate and the lon
g run effects 
of the above experiment are retained, but the m
agnitude of both increases. 
However, the short run effect is lower than the
 long run (see Nerlove (1958]) 
and the convergence toward the mean is a downwa
rd smooth path, rather than 
In general, the
the frequent fluctuations as in the case.where 
d1 > O
. 
structure of the stochastic process of the rela
tive price has an important 
effect on the predicted movements of land alloc
ations due to changes in prices 
This includes the magnitude ofor/and other variables that affect prices. 
the difference between the immediate response (
short run) and the average 
c~1anee (long run) in land allocations due ·to ch
anges in prices. 
In order to see the difference between a cost o
f adjustment model and 
a model where land productivity deteriorate, co




Case 1: Land productivity deteriorates such tha
t -
A 
• d • .1, and 
the land allocation decision rule i~: 
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Case 2: An adjustment costs model where d = -.1 ~nd 
the land allocation decision rule is~ 
A = .48A l + 49.0 - 3.08Rt l + 2.33alt llt lt- - -
Assuming that the innovations in Rt and alt processes are distributed as 
normal with mean zero and variance of one, we simulated the model for 100 
observations. The means and the variances for land allocations are 40.2 
and 4.8 for case 1 and 39.6 and 29.0 for case 2. The wide difference in the 
variance of land allocations between case one and two· is due to the strong 
responses (high elasticity) to changes in prices and shocks to productivity 
in the adjustment costs model vis-a-vis moderate responses (low elasticity) 
in the case of deterioration in land productivity.8 Figure 1 depicts· the 
difference in the area responses to a once-but-not-for-all shock in producti­
vity - - the "Cobweb Phenomenon" in case one and the conventional adjustment 
process in case two. 
0 RESPO:~SES OF AREA 
0 
~~ Case-1 
0 ...._._._ Case 2g,.,. 
.-1 8 



















This line of reasoning emphasizes the important ro
le of the dynamic 
structure of the production technology, the inform
ation farmers have at the 
time inputs are committed to production and the wa
y relative prices are 
moving over time, in the determination of farmers'
 response to changes in 
crop prices. In order to understand the dynamics 
of supply, to evaluate and 
to predict farmers' responses to changes in incent
ives, we should investigate 
jointly the dynamics of the production process and
 the dynamics of the actual 
crop prices tbat faff.'ers observe. ~ote that the tr
aditional supply response 
model ignores both of them. 
Estimating the underlying parameters of the model 
is one of the main 
objectives in the process of understanding supply 
responses and the land 
Equation (3.9) is almost a regression equation.allo.cation decision process. 
If we do not observe so~e of the variables that ar
e part of the farmers' 
information set, we can construct an error term fo
r (3.9) that has the 
This equation has a distributed lagproperties of a re~ression equation. 
form where the coefficients are some non-linear fu
nctions of the parameters 
in the objective function (3.5) and the stochastic
 processes (3.6). Further~ 
more, the reduced form of this equation is observa
tionallv equivalent to the 
traditional supply response model (Nerlove [1958, 
1979]), but the model of 
this work has a completely different interpretation
 of the observed pattern 
of serial and cross-correlations between crop area
s and crop prices.
9 In 
particular, the correlations that we may find by e
stimating the reduced form 
distributed lag equation frori (3.9) reveals alnost
 nothing rer,arding the 
response to the traditional experiment of a one-an
d-for-all change in the 
Horeover, we do not restrict the sum of t!le coeffi
cients
relative prices. 
to one and their values have noon the lagged Rt 
's to be less or equal 
16 
particular economic or econometric meaning. Finally the existance of any 
pattern of serial and cross-correlations between areas and prices can be 
due to controlled technological constraint (e.g. depletion of nitrate or costs 
of adjustment) or/and uncontrolled variables (e.g. shocks to productivity) 
that are not observed by the econor.ietrician. Hence, the interpretation of 
any observation is entirely an empirical question that can be partially 
resolved by estinat_inr, the above model. 
IV. Land Allocations and Other Inputs 
What are the effects of fertilizer, labor and pesticides on the land 
allocation decision rule? In general, if the production_ function of crop 
one is separable between land and any other inputs, the decision rule (3. 9) 
stavs the same. The average product of land may change due to labor and 
fertilizer decisions and the separability does not rule out substitution 
between factors of production. 
Theoretically, we can specify a_production function that exhibits 
a complicated interactions between factors of production which includes 
both static and dynamic elements. Hansen and Sargent [1981] discuss 
methods for solving these types of moJels. The main problems in 
attempting to do this are more practical. First, we usually do not have 
observations on inputs (aside from land) according to their allocation for 
the different produced crops. Second, the number of series and parameters 
increases such that we are not able to estimate the system. However, the 
interaction between inputs may affect the main dynamic properties of the 
land allocation decision rule. To see that_ we consider a simple exarnple 
with fertilizer. Let Flt be the fertilizer that is allocated to crop 1 
at time t, and let the production function for crop 1 be, 
lAlt-1 Alt
(1-----}+wF






 positive scalars. Then, substituting (3.3)' rathe
r than 
(3.3) into (3.1) and su"i,)tracting the cost of fertil
izer from the farmer's 
proble~, we can find the first order necessary cond
itions of the farmer's 
problem with respect to Flt and A1t9 Hence
, we can solve for Flt in terms of 
Alt and the current price of fertilizer, since Flt 
has no dynamic interaction 
10
with Alt• Then, 
(4.1) fort• O, 1, 2, ••• 
where PFt is the price of fertilizer at time t .divi
ded by the price of crop 
one. Using (4.l), the first order condition with respect to ~
t can be 




= g +2 1 
1
1 • a
1 --- lt 
-
• A ' 2 
Solving (4.2) using the methods in Appendix A, the lan
d allocation 
decision rule has exactly the same form as the solu
tion for the original 
llere we have the price of fertilizer, PF, as an add
itional
problem (3.5). 
element in the optimal decision rule and in the unc
ontrolled vector stochastic 
However, we may have one important difference betwe
en the two
process of zt. 
d
g + µ the coefficient g is negative and if l}I> 1 + S·solution~. 1 A 




land allocation is positive such as in the costs of adjustmentcase. The 
economic interpretation of the above result is very simple. If the production 
of crop one is very responsive to fertilizer applications (large w and small1 
w ), the rotation element in land allocation may completely disappear. In the 
above example the predicted effects of changes in the expected price of 
canfertilizer are exactly as of the relative crop price (R) and crop 2 
one.be viewed as taking the role of fertilizer in the land allocation for crop 
The above example shows that direct interaction of different factors 
of production with land productivity. may strongly affect the dynamic proper­
ties of the optimal land allocations and the supply responses to changes in 
the relevant prices. 
V. Time Series Analysis and Estimation 
Econometric analysis of observed data is central to the understanding 
of the dynamics of crop supply and land allocations. The main objective is 
to evaluate whether a particular qualitative interpretation of a general 
phenomena is supported by the data. Furthermore, quantitative evaluations 
of supply responses to changes in incentives improve our ability to measure 
and to forecast the effects of policies and distortions in agriculture. In 
sections III and IV we show~d that the dynamic properties of the technology 
may have important implications for production responses to changes in prices. 
Hence, the goal is to estimate the model's parameter and to test the model's 
assumption using all the restrictions and information that are included in 
the model and the available data. 
An important virtue of models such as in section III and IV is that 
the solution provides a system of linear equations by which we can estimate 
the model's parameters and test the model's assumptions. The reduced form 
19 
equations of almost any model based on a linear-quadratic opti
mization 
problem, is a system of stochastic difference equations which 
consist of 
The equations of the endogenousexogenous and endogenous stochastic variables. 
variables are linear transformations of the decision rules and
 the additive 
errors are due to unobserved exogenous variables. The exogeno
us variables 
equations are part of the optimization problem (e.g., (3.6) in
 section III). 
In general, the reduced form equations can be written as a vec
tor ARMA model 
that is subject to cross equation and within equation restricti
ons. Thus, 
the reduced form coefficients are non-linear functions of the 
underlying para­
meters of the model. Furthermore, the model's parameters are 
usually over 
identified and efficient estimation methods require the joint 
estimation of 
all equations.
11 If the unobserved variables are assumed to have a low order 
(e.g. first order) serial correlation we usually can write the
 reduced form as a 
finite order vector autoregression (VAR) or a systet11 of stocha
stic linear 
difference equations. The exogenous stochastic variables have
 the assumed 
caused by the endogenous variables.property that they are not Granger (1969] 
This property holds only if the observed variables are not Gran
ger caused by 
unobserved variables.
12 Then, the reduced form VAR has a triangular form. 
The models in the previous sections exhibit the property that 
different specifications of farmers' objective functions and co
nstraints 
as well as different market structures give rise to almost ide
ntical reduced 
Hence, the a priori choice of a particular specification ofform equations. 
a mo<lel for estirr.ation is not a well defined problem that can 
rizorously be 
solved. 
In what follows, we first introduce the data set from our case
 study - -
20 
Egyptian agriculture. Then, we analyze and summarize the dynamic properties 
of the data by estir,1ating and simulating a finite order unrestricted VAR. 
Finally, ,-re present estimation results of a particular specification of the 
land alJ_ocation nooel for two crops. 
V.1. Cotton and Wheat in Egyptian Agriculture 
The motivation for this study comes largely from the important 
role of cotton and wheat in agricultural production and the balance 
of trade of the Egyptian economy, as well as the fairly good time 
13 
series data available on them. We us~d fifty-seven annual observations 
on crop areas, prices and output for the period 1913-1969. 
The reasons for selecting cotton and wheat for our analysis of the 
Egyptian case can be summarized as follow: 14 
(1) Cotton is the main crop in production and both the lint and 
the seeds have been the main sources of export earnings for many years 
(since 1880). 
(2) Wheat is second to cotton in production; its growing period 
overlaps with that of cotton and it is a part of the crop rotation system 
that Egyptian farmers follow. Furthermore, wheat became an important 
imported commodity and substitution between wheat and cotton in production 
has a direct effect on the trade balance. 
{3) Soil deterioration and insect accumulation in soils under continuous 
cotton production are the main reasons for crop rotation in Egyptian agriculture. 
(4) Since both wheat and cotton are traded it is reasonable to 
assume that their prices are determined in the world markets and are unaffec­
ted by Egyptian production. The average cotton area and the average cotton 
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land productivity show almost no trend over the entire century. However, 
we observe frequent and sharp fluctuations in cotton as well as in wheat 
total acreage after 1912. The average wheat area has also stayed the same 
but productivity has been increasing since about 1960. 
15
V.2 Estimating and Simulating Unrestricted VAR's 
We estimated a finite order VAR of the following vector of variables; 
Cotton lint price (COT-P) over wheat price (WT-P), cotton area (COT-AR), 
wheat area (WT-AR), cotton lint yield (COT-YLD) and wheat yield (WT-YLD) over 
the period 1913-1969 with a constant, a linear trend and a dut!lilly for the 
Second World War period. Each variable is regressed on its own lags and 
lags of the other variables such that the error is a serially uncorrelated 
innovation for that variable. We do not impose any linear, non-linear or 
16 zero restrictions on the system. Then Zellner's seeningly unrelated 
regressions method is used in estimating the coefficients and the 
variance-covariance matrix of the vector of innovations. 
2The asymptotic likelihood ratio tests (x test) for lag length 
rejected specifications with less than five lags. In order to test for 
non-Granger causality fror., areas and yields to the relative prices, we use 
F-tests for the separate equations. The test for exclusions of lagged 
COT-Al~, 1-:'T-AR, COT-YLD and WT-YLD from the relative price equation have 
F values of .94, 1.17, 1.33 and 2.16 with significance levels of .47, .35, 
.23 and .09, respectively. Hence, we do not reject the hypothesis of 
non-Granger causality from areas and yields on prices and we support the 
hypothesis that crop prices are not affected by farmers' decisions on 
land allocation. 
The estioated unrestricted VAR sur.unarizes the dynamic properties of 
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the data. Following Sims [1978, 1980] and Sargent (1978] we interpret the 
results by looking at the moving average representation (MAR) of the model. 
It turns out that the MAR is equivalent to the simulated responses of the 
variables to a once-but-not-for-all one standard deviation change in the 
innovations. In order to do so we imposed a tria.ngularized linear transfor­
mation on the system of estimated equations, such that the variance-covariance 
matrix of the transformed vector of innovations is the identity raatrix. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of 15 years ahead decomposition of the 
forecast error variance that is produced by each innovation. 
TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE OF FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE 15 YEARS AHEAD 
PRODUCED BY EACH INNOVATION 
Triangularized Innovation in:* 
COT-P 
WT-P COT-AR 'WT-AR COT-YLD WT-YLD 
COT-P 45 9 21 17 8 
WT-P 
COT-AR 17 52 9 14 7 
WT-AR 15 14 48 9 14 
COT-YLD 9 10 18 57 8 
WT-YLD 15 18 14 8 46 
*The order of the triangularization is according to the above order of the 
variables. 
The innovation in any variable accounts for most of the variance 
The innovations in prices are theerror in the same variable. 
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second-most important factor in accounting for the variance error of la
nd 
allocations. These results support the claim that farmers in Egypt do
 
respond to prices in making their decision. llowever, a low response t
o 
prices cannot determine whether farners do not optimize with rational 
expectations. To_ illustrate this claim, we can consider the simple ex
ample 
of the land allocation model from section III. The resulting forecast
 error in 
area accounted for by innovation 1n the price is 60 percent for Case 1 whe
re 
there is a deterioration of land productivity (d1 > 0), 
and 70 percent for 
Case 2 where there is a cost of adjusting land (d1 
< 0). Therefore, the 
fact that innovations in_prices account for a low proportion of the va
riance 
error can be attributed to technological constraints. The results of 
the 
esti~ated forecast error do not support the exogeneity of prices, and i
ndicate 
t:1at the F-test support of the null hypothesis is due to a hirh varianc
e of 
the estinated coefficients. In addition, the sinul_ated responses of a
ll 
Thus, the systemvariables converr,ed to nUiilbers that are close to zero. 
seens to be stationary. 
The interesting phenooenon that has been observed from the computed 
:1AR is that COT-AR and WT-AR respond to innovations in any variable in
 
opposite ways; that is, ,,.,hen COT-AR increases, UT-AR decreases and bot
h 
Figure 2 shows this result for innovations in COT-Pfrequently fluctuate. 
over lIT-P. The positive (negative) one-step-ahead response of COT-AR 
(WT-AR) 
to an innovation in the relative price is as ve can expect for alnost 
any 
product. However, most adjustnent-type theories predict a smooth grad
ual 
return to the mean. Notice that this is not the case here. The secon
d 
step is a sharp decrease (increase) in COT-All (WT-AR), and the third i
s an 
increase, etc. Then the fluctuations becooe less frequent. It turns 
out 
24 
that this phenomenon exists in all of the estimated VAR's and in response 
to innovation in alnost any variable. 
These fluctuations in cotton and wheat areas are the same as the 
responses of the land allocation decision rules in the model of section III. 
In particular, figure 1 shows that deterioration in land productivitv 
may account for this type of "Cobweb phenomenon". Hence, the main dynamic 
phenomenon in the data is consistent with a niodel of dynamic technology, 
optimization and rational expectati9ns. 
0 . 
0 
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V.3 Estimating the Dynamic Land Allocation Model 
In this section we present results from maximum likelihood 
estirlator of a simple bivariate specification of the land allocation m
odel 
using Egyptian annual data on cotton area, cotton lint price, wheat pr
ice 
and wheat yield from 1913 to 1969.
17 Following the traditional agricultural 
supply response models, the two variables are the cotton crop area (A
lt) and 
We assume that Rt and the shocks to productivitythe relative price (Rt) •
18 
(a1 t) have
 the following autoregressive processes.
19 
R
( R = a + alRt-1 + a2Rt-2 + ut0<( •
(5.1) CJ. !Pl< 1
\ alt 
= p alt-1 + ut 
2
where we assume that 
\. 
IP I <1 and the roots of 11 - a1z - a2z I-= 0 
are outside the unit circle• 
Using the farmer's land allocation decision rule (3.9), and since 
we do not observe alt' we can write the VAR for Alt and Rt as 







+ + 0 00 Rlt-2 
period (1941-45),where WAR represents dummies for the second World War 





decision rule (3.9) which can not be identified separately, £lt = µ3ut-l 
R 
and £Zt = ut • µ1 , µ and µ3 , as they are defined in (
5.3), are the 
2 
restrictions across the equations in (5.2) and they represent the inplications 
of the rational expectations hypothesis and were obtained from the forecasting 
20
formula in Appendix A. 
I a2)..Al [ al + =µl 
, 
]
d 1- a >.. - a2)..1 
I Al a2 
(5. 3) < µ2 = d [ 1- a >.. «l2]1 -
Al p 
µ3 = [d 1 PA ]\ 
\ .. 
Here (£lt, €zt)' is the vector of innovations that is assumed to 
have a bivariate normal distribution with E (£ £' ) = V • Hence, estimators t t 
of the free parameters 
by maximizing the likelihood function with respect to Q • Let Q,t= (ilt ,t2t)' 
be the sample residual vector for given value of the parameter vector Q. 
Then the loi likelihood function of the sample of observations on the 
residuals over t = 1, ••• , Tis 
..J' T 
(5.4) ~ (Q) = -T log (ZIT). - T/2 log !vi - .!. I £t(Q)V-l £t(Q)2 t=l 
where the number of variables (equations) is two. For a given 9, with V 
unknown, the maximum likelihood estimator of V can be found by setting 
(see Bard [1974]): 
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(5.5) 
Substituting (5.5) into (5.4) we obtain the concentrated
 likelihood function as, 
(5.6) was maximized with respect to 9 where 1t(G) is def
ined by 
(5.2) and (5.3) for each observation.
22 Observe that (5.2) has eleven 
non-zero resressors while the vector 9 has only nine fre
e parameters. 
Hence, there are two over-identifying restrictions that 
are due to the 
theory which imposed the restrictions in (5.3). These r
estrictions as 
well as the a priori zero restrictions will be tested u
sing conventional 
likelihood ratio tests. 
Table 2 
*
Estimated Parar.1eters of the Land Allocation Hodel 
1551.03.081 l-10 -=Al = 
a .. 3.79d -= -.OOB 0 
wl - -719.130:1 = .524 
.06
Cl -= .250 w2 C 2 
p = .081 
The log likelihood• ~ (G) • -506.088 
* B • discount factor• .95, imposed a priori. 
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The estimated parameters (see table 2) of the model satisfy the. 
restrictions that we imposed on the farmer's problem in section III, i.e., 
2Ip I < 1 the roots of I1- a.1 z - a.2z I = 0 are outside the unit 
circle and the sign of dis opposite to the sign of A1 • 
However, the 
hypothesis that Egyptian cotton production exhibits sif;nificant deteriora-
tion in land productivity is not supported by the point estimators of >-1 
and d. 
In particular, the values of Al and dare consistent with costs of adjustment 
effect in production and are not compatible with our simple specification 
of the soil deterioration in cotton production. In section IV we showed how 
interaction between land and fertilizer may affect the dynamics of land 
allocations such that if we omit the data on fertilizer, >-1 
may be positive. 
Thus, the traditional omitted variable argument may explain the "wrong" signs 
of >-1 
and cl. Usine the estimated parameters we can calculate the response 
It turnsof land allocations to a permanent or temporary chanee in prices. 
out that the lonE run supply elasticity, i.e., the percent of change in the 
mean of A1 
divided by the percent of change in the mean of R, is equal to 
-.13.23 
Under the null hypothesis that the model is correct, the estimators 
in table 2 are consistent and the inverse of the &ssian at the maximum is 
the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the estimators. Let-, (Q) be 
the value of the log likehood of the model and let,,.,,:_.·· · be the value of theu 
1oz likelihood of an estimated unrestricted version of the VAR (5.2). Then, 
,., 
-2 ( :~ (Q) - ~·· ) is distributed x-(q), where q is the number of restrictionsu 
that are tested. Table 3 reports the estimated VAR for the land allocation 
model and two unrestricted alternatives. From testing the restrictions 
that are imposed by the theory (not the a priori zero restrictions) the 
TABLE 3 
THE REDUCED FORH F.STIHATES OF (5. 2) 
The Ho<lel's VAR,-· (Q) = -506.0811 
. - .. 1 rA 1 
,- "1 t 1551.0 -719 .1
 [.16 5.7 ·1 ' Alt-1 r:-.006 2.1 1 Alt-2! O -.21 ·1 Ii lt-3;I 
I I
' "" 
+ WAR+ +:I I+ 
' II I 
.2J 0 _ILRt 3.8 .06 10 .J2I I_ Rt-1 . lo ltt-2 J I_ 0 I nt-3 .I 
The Unrestricted VAR (with zero restrictions)• J 1 = -505.409ti 
- 0 -4.4 A 
''1t I j1563.S j -724.5 .19 3.3 Alt-1 -.06 
7.2 Alt-2 lt-3 
+- I I + WAR+ + I t;g 
0 .21 R 0 0 Rt-3
Rt I I 3.9 1 I .s1j 0 .56 .Rt-1 t-2 
The Unrestricted VAR (without zero restrictions) ,-:u2 -= -495
.9 
9.7 
"-it l ,1197 .6 1 r-661.4 1 r.21 -7.61 rAlt-11 + r-.11 -a.1 I !i'it-2l I .21 I I Alt-3
- I I +I I WAR+ I 
Rt I I -:-14.2 I I 4 .Ci I , .005 • 36_1 I. Rt-1 I I .002 .11__, l_'tt-2 j 
I .oo,, • 36 I I At-3 
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Hence, the theoreticalmarginal confidence level is less than .5 (x
2 
(2) = 1. 2). 
Furthermore, since therestrictions have not been rejected by the data. 
VAU' s parameters of the two models turn out to be very close, there is 
high confidence in the model's interpretation of the reduced form paramete
rs. 
However, the likelihood ratio test of our model versus a complete three 
lar,s unrestricte<l VAR, rejects (at 5;~ significant level) the null hypothesis 
with marginal confidence level of • 995 (x
2 
(7) = 20. 3). Likelihood ratio tests 
of lag length for the conplete unrestricted (symmetric lags) rejected 2 vs
. 4 
lags (marginal confidence level = • 92), but did not reject 3 vs. 4 lags 
(marginal confidence level= .44). 
These results suggest that a naive specification of the model such 
can successfully interpret a bivariate simultaneous,as in section III 
dynamic and stochastic system. However, the Egyptian data require a more 
complete specification of the environment that should consider higher lag 
orders(e.g., higher order of productivity deterioration) as well as some 
existance of feedback from lap,ged areas (production) on current prices 
24
(e.g., local denand for cotton.) 
VI. Concludinp; Remarks 
This worl: is hest viewed as an atterapt to construct an economic theory 
that is stochastic, dynanic and simultaneous and that can interpret observ
ed 
data on land allocations, crop yields and prices. By introducin~ an expli
cit 
approxiraation to a well knmm characteristic of the crop productio:.1 proces
s 
(depletion of soil productivity), we der.10nstrate hoH the dynanic propertie
s 
of the land allocations and their interaction with crop prices depend on 
the production technology. Thus, the model's paraneters can interpret the 
dynamics of land allocations as a result of 3ifferent technologies: the de
pletion 
effect in land productivity; costs of adjusting crop areas; due to omitte
d inputs 
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In such a !!lodel the sur,!'lY responsethat interact with 1 and (e.g. , fertilizer). 
elasticities arc functions of the technology and the p
arar.ieters of the price 
processes. It turns out that our model received slim 
support from the data. 
Structural estimates conform to a cost of adjustment fr
amework, even though 
the estinated VAR's (Figure 3) exhibit a dynamic pheno!!
lenon that seems to be 
Analysis of changes in the economiccor.1patible wi t1 the depletion effect. 
structure due to exor;enous intervention (e.g., policy) 
requires an underlying 
That might be achieved hy conside­mo<lel ti.int is not rejected hy the data. 
In particular, land
ring ac1<litional dynanic components of the crop market. 
allocation decisions arc oade annually but other input
s can be a~plied.. 
throughout the 1;rowinr; and harvesting seasons; the deoa
nd for crops is 
relatively stable over tine, but output is produced ov
er only a short 
interval tlurin0 the year; nost crops are storal,le,
 hotllogenous and are 
usually traclcdin future riarkets. Each of the above ch
aracteristics of 
crop narkcts contains a non-trivial dyn·an.ic element wh
ich our economic 
theory an<l the econometric franework should consider fo
r a meaningful 
interpretation of the observed economic data on farr.ier
s' production 
activities - - the a~ricultural supply. 
Al 
Appendix A: Solution to quadratic Optimal Control Problem Under 
Uncertainty 
Consider the discrete time control problem, to maximize 
N 
(A.1) E_ .tim I:
1 t=ON......, 
where {c } 
00 
is a stochastic process with mean exponential order 
t t=O 
less than 1/ /a , the discount factor e, satisfied 
0 < B < 1, f and g are positive and g/d satisfies+ 00 > lg/di > 1 + e. 
The maximization in (A.l) is subject to the initial condition A_1 
')5 
given, and is over A
0 
, A1, A , ••••• ~ 2 
The quadratic form of (A.1) implies that we can use the 
certainty equivalence or separation theorem by first solving (A.l) 
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for the certainty case. In particular, we may regard the sequence 
of as known and of exponential order less than 1/ /a . 
To obtain the first order necessary conditions for maximization 
of (A.l), let fix N >> 1 in (A.l), differentiate with respect to 
A0 , A1
, ••• ,~,and then set the derivatives to zero. 
(A. 3) 
A2 
(A.2) are the N Euler equations, and (A.3) is the terminal condition. 
For the infinite time problem (A.1), the Euler equations are the same, 
but the transversality condition is found by taking the limit of (A.3) 
as 
~. Further, we impose the condition that At-<A<+• for all. t • O, 1, ••• , 
where A is a positive and a finite scalar. Thus, the solution for{At 1•t•0 
should satisfy the condition 
(A.4) 
Given that d~0, we can rewrite (A.2) as: 
(A.5) can be solved uniquely for a given A_1, the tr
ansversality 
condition and (A.4). First, we seek a factorization of (A.5) such tha
t: 
(1 + _L L + ! t 2) • (1 - >. L) (1 - >.2 L).8d ~ 1 
Given O < S < 1, the sign and the values of >.1 and >. 2 are
 determined 
by the sign and the value of g/d. Furthermore, if jg/di> 1 + S 
A3 
We can rewrite equation (A.5) as: 
1
where "1 = - t- -
and 
Take the non-stable part (1- >.2L} to 
the right-hand-side of the 
equation and solve it "forward" in order t
o satisfy the transversality 
condition and (A.4). Hence, 
r
j=O 
As a result the unique solution for the Eu
ler equations (A.2) for all 
t = 0,1,2, ••• , and the given A_1 , is: 
(A. 7) 
In the certainty case (A.7) is the optimal
 decision rule for the 
Now we add uncertainty by assuming thatinfinite horizon problem (A.l). 
the sequence {ct} 
a, 
t=O is a stochastic process. Then the opti
mal rule for 
the uncertainty case is obtained by replac
ing (f + ct+j) with Et_1 (f + 
ct+j} 
in (A.7), since the certainty equivalence 
principle applies to (A.1). 
Therefore, the unique solution, if it exis
ts, has the following form: 
• 
A4 
(A.8) At • 
for all t • 0,1,2, ••• 
In order to find the optimal decision rule for At, the terms Et(ct+j> 
must be eliminated by expressing them as functions of variables known 
by agents at time t. Hence, we should specify the agents' information set..
at time t and the form of the stochastic process {ct}t=O that 
the optimization problem (A.1) is subject to. 
Suppose ct• '1.t + c1t + ••• + crt and let 
clt slt 







where n>r and St is a vector of n-r variables. Furthermore, let Zt • 
st 
and we assume that the stochastic process of Zt is of mean exponential 
order less than 1/./f and can be approximated by a finite order Markov 
process, i.e., 
AS 
is an n x n matrix for j = 1, ..• , k, ut is an n x 1 vector, where 
' E(Ut °'t-l) = 0, E[UtUt] = 1:t, 1: is a positive semi-definite matrix t 
} is the agent's information set at time t-1,and nt-1 = {Zt-1' zt-2' .... 
when the decision on At is made. 
(A.9)and the above information set complete the specification 
of the stochastic optimal control problem (A.1) and provide sufficient 
conditions for existance and uniqueness for the analytical solution 
19of the decision rule for At (A.11, below). Following Hansen and Sargent 
[1980] and Eckstein (1981], the optimal projection for (A.8) given (A.9) 
.and the information set, nt-l' is: 
(A.10) l: 
j=O 
where v = (1, 1, ••• , 1, 0, 0, ••• , 0] is a row vector with ones in the 
first r positions and zeros in the next n-r positions, and wherev•Zt = ct, 
A= A B and I is an nxn identity matrix.
1 
The optimal decision rule for A is: 
t 
(A.11) At= AlAlt-l + y + ~(L). Zt-l fort= 0,1,2, •••• 
where 
is a scalar 
A6 
and 
-1- ;. I}. 
such that 
and µi is a 1 x n row vector for i•l, •••
 ,k. 
In order to solve the different proble
ms in this paper one may use the 
following definitiojs: 
Problem (3.5) 
r .. f + d... 1 1 
S, is satisfied.
Observe that the condition for real s
olution, i.e. I g/d I > 1 + 
Problem (3.5) with (3.3}' as the prod
uction function 
and r • 3. 
A7 
Appendix B: Adjustment Costs, the sign of the parameter d and 
the roots Al and A2• 
Suppose we consider a quadratic objective function with adjustment costs, 
such ad t~1ese t~1at were co.:,si~ereJ by Sargent [1979], (aiaoug others) for firms and 
Then, the objectivehouseholds decisions on capital, labor and consumption. 
function includes the following typical term: 
where hand h are postive scalars. Observe that
1 
GO 
I: 2 hl 2 bl 2
J = at f-
h 
}2 At - 2 At + hlAtAt-1 --y- At-1
t=O 
t 
GO Cl0hl 2 hl 2 hl!3 2atand that: I: (- 2 At-1) = --A - at -2-At2 -1t=O t•O 
Then let 
GO h+h1 (l+a) h 
J' = I: at { - ---- = J +ii 
2 2 -1t=O 
Since A_ is given, the optimization of J'is identical to the optimization of J:1 
In order to compare J' with the dynamic term in (A.l) let, ... 
T = I: 
t=O 
It is clear that if -d = hl > 0 and g = h + h (1+!3) then 1 • J' and the
1 
condition lg/di > (l+B) is satisfied, since 
A8 
Hence, the problem (A.1) is equiv
alent to the adjustment costs pro
blem that 
has been considered in the litera
ture if and only if dis negative
. 
However, if dis positive, then w
e have d • - h1 
> 0 and g • h-d (1 +S)> 0 
h Then the requirement for a real 
solution
which implies that d > (1 +s). 
From (A.6), 
for (A.1) is equivalent to viewin
g gin T as equal to h in J. 
it is clear that for a given g > 
0, sign (d) • - sign (A1) 
and that the 
If g < 0 the above solution
value of jA11 is depen
dent of the .!!!m,of d. 
for (A.1) is a minimum and not a 
maximum. Finally, we can say tha
t for the 
A1 and
 A2 is de
termined
difference equations (A.5) the si
gn of the roots 
If this parameter is greater 
by the sign of the parameter tha
t multiply At. 
than (1 + S) in absolute value, the r
oots are real and 
one. 
FOOTNOTES 
1see Behrman [1968] for a detailed discussion of the issues and 
a complete country work that follows the Nerlovian model. See Eckstein 
[1981) for a critical review of the Nerlovian model. 
2This approach follm,s Sargent [1979, 1981] an<l is consistent with 
T.H. Schultz'[1978, p. 4] view: 
Farmers the world over, in dealing with costs, 
returns and risks, are calculating economic 
agents. \Ji thin their small, individual, 
allocation domain they are fine-tuning 
entrepreneurs, tuning so subtly that 
many experts fail to see how efficient 
they are, ••• 
3see (A.6) and the definitions at the encl of Appendix A. 
4See Hansen and Sargent [1981] 
5The Nerlovian supply response model uses the costs of adjustment 
argument to justify adjustment in actual area vis-a-vis desired land 
allocations. (See Nerlove [ 1958, 1979]). 
6robin [1972] put it: 
"Price movements observed and experienced do not necessarily convey 
information on the basis of which a rational man should alter his view of 
the future. When a blight destroys half the midwestern corn crop and corn 
prices subsequently rise, the information conveyed is that blights raise 
prices. No trader or farmer under these circunstances would change his 
view on the future of corn prices, much less of their rate of change, unless 
he is led to reconsider his estimated of the likelihood of blights." 
7
The underlying parameter that we hold fixed in both models are: 
gl = .25 , S = .9 , fl= 20 , A= 80 , Rt= 5 + .5Rt-l + u: and 
alt= •4 alt-1 + u: • 
F2 
8
Obszrve that if Rt and a1t were fixe
d, but Alt still random, the 
variance of Alt would have been the~ for both cases. 
9




The production function (3.3) explicitly rulesout any carr
y over 
effects that are usually exist in fertilizers applications
. 
11specification and estimation of linear rational expectati
ons models 
are discussed in Hansen [1980], llansen and Sargent [1980
a], Sargent (1978] 
The joint estimation of even a specific small model-turnsand Wallis [1980]. 
out to be complicated and expensive co~putatio~~1lv. (e.
~. see Sar~ent 
[1978], Eckstein [1981] and Eichenbaum (1981]). 
12rbe properties of Granger causality, econoMetric exogen
eity and 
omitted variables are discussed in detail iri Granger (196
9], Sims (1972], Hansen 
and Sargent (1980] and Sargent [1979a]. 
13Almost the same data have been used by Hansen and Nashas
hibi 
[1974, 1975] and is available also in Eckstein (1981]. 
14oetailed discussions are available in Owen (1969], Hansen
 and 
Uarzouk [1965], Hansen and nashashibi [1975], Hansen (196
4] and Eckstein 
[1981]. 
15It should be emphasized that the results from estir.lating 
several 
unrestricted VAR's have preceded the fornulation of the m
odels in section 
III and IV. Detailed information on the results and the 
methodology exists 
in Eckstein (1931]. We estimated several different vecto
rs of variables 
F3 
and the results turn out to be almost the same for all systems of equations. 
Here we report on only one systefil. 
1
'1ie methodology for estimating and interpreting VAR's models was 
developed by Sims [1978, 1980] who used it to analyze macroeconomic questions. 
T. Doan and R. Littennan's package of Regression Analysis of Time Series (RATS) 
has been used for computations. 
and Sargent [1930], Sargent (1978] and Hallis [1980]. The time domain full-
information maximum likelihood is the most conventional method for multivariate 
non-linear models. It turns out that for our model this method is also compu­
tationally efficient versus frequency domain approximations of the likelihood 
function. In the author's [1981] work a four variate model has been estimated, 
using frequency domain approximations to the likelihood function. 
13 Wheat Production 1 
R = ~-fueat Price X X /cotton Lint Price 
t Uheat Area 
and is equivalep~ to Rt in section III. 
19 (5.1) is a particular specification for equation (3.6). Since alt 
is not observed we assume the lowest autoregressive process. The lag order 
in Rt process is supported by estimating univariate autoregressive process. 
20
\le define >. , A and d in section III.
1 
2
\-le fixed the discount factor at f3 = •95 
22T'ne · · · ms b done . DFP a1 . 1 f rom he1 een using gorit 1m t GOOPTnax1m1zat1on . 
?acka~e of Princeton University. The complicated non-linear structure of 
the model implies no gain from writing the analytical first and second 
derivatives, hence, ue used the derivatives-free method. He held 10 dir,it 
F4 
accuracy level and checked that \ve don't have in ''the neizhborhood" 
anotiier maxinum. \Je do not report the asym?toticstandard errors of our 
estimators since the Hessian, at the maxir.lun, had not been negative defin
ite. 
The computer pror;r.:ira had been tested usinB a Honte-Carlo experiment of 
the same model that -we estimated. 
23rhe nean of R a 16.8 
The mean of A = 1530.0 
16.8 ., -.13
T11e elasticity= 1530. 
24A brief d:i.scussion of models for land allocation that incorporates 
denand for cotton and wheat e>:ists in Eckstein [1981]. 
25Problem (A.l) is a special case of the r,eneral type of problems 
that are considered by Ilansen and Sargent [1981]. 
26See Sir.ion [1956], Theil [1959] ·and Sargent (1979]. 
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